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Scholars have grown concerned that the commercialization of academic science is 
increasing secrecy at the expense of cooperation and information sharing. Using data 
from comparable surveys of academic scientists in three fields (experimental biology, 
mathematics and physics), we test whether scientists have become more competitive and 
more secretive over the last 30 years.  We also use the recent survey to test a multivariate 
model of the effects of scientific competition and commercialization (patenting, industry 
funding and industry collaboration) on scientific secrecy.  We find that secrecy has 
increased, and has increased particularly for experimental biologists.  Only 13% of 
experimental biologists in 1998 felt safe discussing their ongoing research with all others 
doing similar work.  Our multivariate analysis shows that this secrecy is most related to 
concerns about being anticipated (scientific competition).  We find that patenting is 
associated with increased secrecy among mathematicians and physicists, but not for 
experimental biologists. We find that industry funding is associated with more secrecy, 
while industry collaboration is associated with less secrecy, across fields.  Our results 
suggest that the recent concern over increasing scientific secrecy has merit. However, this 
increased secrecy seems to result from a combination of increasing commercial linkages 
and increased pressures from scientific competition. Our research highlights the central 
role that scientists’ competition for priority plays in the system of science and that, while 
such competition spurs effort, it also produces negative effects that recent trends toward 
commercialization of academic science seem to be exacerbating. 
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Contemporary capitalist societies depend strongly on the growth of new knowledge 
to fuel rising living standards (Nelson 1996).  Prior work has described this knowledge as 
produced under two fairly distinct institutional environments: academic science and 
industrial research and development.  These two institutional environments provide 
contrasting (and complementary) models for describing the production and dissemination 
of new knowledge.   
Academic science is built on the sometimes contradictory foundations of 
openness and secrecy. In the “ideal type”, scientists are motivated by a priority-
recognition reward system, which encourages scientists to share their findings and 
thereby contribute them to the common stock of scientific knowledge, in exchange for 
recognition by the scientific community for this contribution, through citations, prizes 
and other markers of esteem (Merton 1957). This priority-recognition system helps 
support the norm of communism by creating private incentives for scientist to contribute 
to the scientific commons (Merton 1942). In this academic model of science, the 
scientist’s property right in his discovery is limited to the right to appropriate recognition 
for the contribution (a right, like many forms of social exchange, that is difficult to 
enforce). However, because recognition depends on priority, priority races, and the 
associated secrecy, are endemic in science, from the beginnings of the institutionalization 
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of the modern science system up to the present era (Merton 1957). In contrast to 
academic science, the market model of science emphasizes the incentives from 
privatizing the returns from scientific discoveries through first-mover advantages, secrecy 
and patents (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000; Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, Winter, Gilbert, 
and Griliches 1987; Stephan 1996), with enforceable property rights in inventions. The 
independence of these institutions and their underlying logics is  a relative one, with each 
institution having important influences on the other (Kline and Rosenberg 1986). Merton 
noted in 1942 that the scientific ethos of communism faced conflicts with the wider 
capitalist society within which it was embedded.  Even in the pre-WWII period, 
prominent academic scientists were patenting their inventions, in part to ensure freedom 
to operate for themselves and others.  
Today, as academic science becomes more inter-twined with commercial activity, 
research is more likely to be driven by applicability rather than curiosity (Gibbons, 
Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott, and Trow 1994) and universities are expected 
to contribute to innovation by collaborating with government and industry (Leydesdorff 
and Etzkowitz 1996).  Slaughter and Rhoades (1996) argue that the rise of the 
competitiveness political coalition in the U.S. shifted science and technology policy from 
fighting the Cold War and wars on diseases to emphasizing using science and technology 
to help the U.S. compete in the increasingly globalized economy, and pushed universities 
to contribute more directly to commercialized innovation. Many have argued that the 
culture of universities changes to accommodate competing values (Etzkowitz 1998; 
Hackett 1990; Slaughter and Leslie 1997), and that there are growing tensions within 
universities between these competing models of knowledge creation (Glenna, Lacy, 
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Welsh, and Biscotti 2007; Nelson 2004; Nelson 2006; Owen-Smith 2000; Slaughter and 
Leslie 1997). For example, Glenna, et al. (2007) argue that academic administrators at 
land grant universities are reframing the university’s mission to emphasize technology 
transfer as the goal of research and as fulfillment of the public good mission. 
Beginning around 1980, a series of policy changes reflecting this new 
competitiveness coalition have encouraged universities to engage in commercial activity 
(for a summary, see Slaughter and Rhoades 1996). One of the key changes was the Bayh-
Dole Act (1980), which facilitated universities taking title to Federally funded inventions 
and granting exclusive licenses.  This policy initiative was based on an economic market 
model of science and was designed to “incentivize” the transfer of academic science and 
its development into industrial products or services (Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and 
Ziedonis 2001). Several key court decisions (e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, Harvard’s 
OncoMouse) also laid the foundation for the growth in commercial activity by 
universities, especially bio-tech-related activity. Finally, the success of some early 
patented technologies (e.g., the Cohen-Boyer patent) also served as a model for other 
universities. As a result of these changes in the institutional environment, patenting, 
licensing and university-industry collaboration have all been increasing over the last two 
decades (Association of University Technology Managers [AUTM] 2000; National 
Science Board 2004). For example, Figure 1 shows the increase in patents issued to 
universities from 1983 to 2003.  We see that patenting has grown by almost an order of 
magnitude, with 434 university patents issued in 1983 and 3259 issued in 2003.  Figure 2 
shows data from AUTM’s annual survey on university licensing income. Here, we see 
total annual income increasing from about $200 million in 1991 to about $1.3 billion in 
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2003. Figure 3 presents data on industry funding of research over the last 30 years.  We 
see that funding increased from less than 3% of total university research funds to over 
7%.1 Co-authorships can be seen as another type of university-industry linkage (Slaughter 
and Rhoades 1996). In 1988, 21% of academic papers had an industry co-author. This 
percentage increased to 26% by 2001 (National Science Board 2006). 
--INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE— 
--INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE-- 
--INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE-- 
 
This new environment for academic research leads us to ask the question of whether 
university professors’ increasing integration into the market system of innovation is 
undermining the science system (Nelson 2004; Slaughter and Leslie 1997).  In particular, 
there is a concern that market forces are causing scientists to become more secretive, in 
other words, to abandon the norm of communism.  
Prior work has raised several concerns about the resulting adverse effects of 
commercialization on the norms of science: an unwillingness to share research materials 
(Blumenthal, Campbell, Anderson, Causino, and Louis 1997; Campbell, Clarridge, 
Gokhale, Birenbaum, Hilgartner, Holtzman, and Blumenthal 2002; Walsh, Cho, and 
Cohen 2005), publication delays (Blumenthal et al. 1997; Cohen, Florida, and Goe 1994), 
conflicts of interest resulting in biases in the research results reported (Bekelman, Li, and 
Gross 2003), and redirection of effort away from science and toward more applied, or 
more lucrative, research (Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 1998; Slaughter and Rhoades 
                                                 
1 Recently, the percent of industry funding has begun to decline, dropping from a peak of 
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1996).  
At the same time, there is reason to believe that scientific competition has increased 
(Slaughter and Leslie 1997).  The growth of organized science (i.e., researchers regularly 
engaged in the production of scientific output) produces more competitors for scientific 
recognition, while rewards for such recognition (including both prestigious university 
positions and prestigious prizes) have not grown as quickly. In fact, Slaughter and Leslie 
(1997) argue that the key characteristic of what they term “academic capitalism” is the 
increasing competition in contemporary universities: competition for funding, for prestige, 
and for positions. Empirical work has found some evidence for the effects of both 
commercial activity and scientific competition on secrecy of various forms (Campbell et 
al. 2002; Walsh, Cho, and Cohen 2005).  
Thus, our research will focus on the incidence of such secretive behaviors and the 
factors that seem to be driving these behaviors.  Using a unique set of matched surveys 
conducted about 30 years apart, we propose to test the strength of these competing 
institutional frameworks and normative orders in influencing scientists’ behaviors by 
examining the effects of commercial activity and scientific competition on the 
communication behavior of academic researchers. The main sociological question is 
whether exposure to market ties or commercial activities undermines the scientific norm 
of communism, or are these two institutional spheres complementary at the level of the 
individual scientist?  We will also examine the potential adverse effects of scientific 
competition, and evaluate the extent to which secrecy is driven primarily by market 
competition or by scientific competition. We can also test the conjecture that patenting 
                                                                                                                                                 
just over 7% down to about 5% in 2004 (NSF 2006). 
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(by providing more enforceable property rights in knowledge) might encourage more 
openness in science.  
 
Two Contrasting Models of Science  
 
 
Academic scientists are increasingly straddling two worlds, one organized through 
the academic priority-recognition system (with the ideal type described by Merton) and 
one organized by the rules of market competition. These two institutional domains differ 
significantly in how they treat the results of research and in the reward system for those 
who generate new results.  Because of the public goods nature of knowledge, market-
based systems (and the economists who study them) have long struggled with the 
problem of how to encourage the production (and dissemination) of knowledge 
(Dasgupta and David 1994; Nelson 1959; Scherer 2002).  The lack of proper incentives, 
due to the difficulty in appropriating the rents from new knowledge, generally leads to 
the underproduction of public knowledge (Jaffe 1996).  One solution is secrecy, which 
allows appropriability, but prevents widespread use of the knowledge, and the social 
benefits that would come from such use (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000).  Another 
widely used solution is patenting, which allows privatizing the results temporarily, 
creating an incentive, in exchange for disclosure, and teaching of the invention (which 
then passes into the public domain after the expiration of the patent) (Cohen, Nelson, and 
Walsh 2000; Scherer 1959).  Furthermore, to the extent that intellectual property rights 
[IPRs] are effective, such commercial orientation may lead to greater dissemination of 
scientific knowledge, even though the knowledge may have a non-zero price (Arora, 
Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2001).   
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Academic science, on the other hand, has developed a rival set of institutions for 
rewarding the production and dissemination of knowledge, where scientists receive 
recognition from their peers for being the first (or most convincing) to demonstrate a new 
discovery by communicating their results (and method) to the scientific community 
(David 2003; Merton 1942; Merton 1957). This recognition is the scientist’s intellectual 
property, but is, in the ideal type, the only property right the scientist maintains in his 
discoveries, since once they are announced they are common property: “Once he has 
made his contribution, the scientist no longer has exclusive rights of access to it.  It 
becomes part of the public domain of science.  Nor has he the right of regulating its use 
by others by withholding it unless it is acknowledged as his.  In short, property rights in 
science become whittled down to just this one: the recognition by others of the scientist’s 
distinctive part in having brought the result into being” (Merton, 1973, p. 294-295).  Of 
course, this esteem from colleagues is both its own reward and is also translated into 
pecuniary rewards: primarily well-paid research positions and well-funded labs, as well 
as the cash prizes associated with many scientific awards (the Nobel Prize, for example, 
is over $1million). In addition, there is substantial debate in the sociology of science as to 
whether the norm of communism is in fact internalized by scientists (cf., Hackett 1990; 
Mitroff 1974; Zuckerman 1988). For example, Mitroff (1974) argues that scientists are 
always guided by norms and counter-norms (such as the norm of communism and the 
counter-norm of secrecy), which are in tension (although it is not clear when the norm or 
the counter-norm will dominate). Similarly, Hackett (1990) argues that we can think of 
scientific norms as arrayed in contrasting pairs, with one or the other being emphasized in 
different contexts (for example, in universities versus industry labs, or in one field versus 
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another, or in universities before the rise of the competitiveness agenda versus after). The 
conflicting norms of openness and secrecy are one example. Thus, even within the world 
of academia, scientists have to reconcile these conflict principles of conduct. However, 
even if we do not assume a strong norm of communism, the incentives associated with 
the priority-recognition system encourage dissemination of research findings. Thus, 
either through compliance with a communism norm, or response to a recognition-based 
reward system, the academic world (in contrast with the market world) is one based on 
sharing of research results. This priority-based reward system leads to frenzied efforts by 
scientists to put more and more information into the public domain (as demonstrated both 
by the ever increasing number and rate of publications in science and by the long hours 
that scientists work, particularly among those who are competing at the frontiers of high-
profile fields). However, as Merton points out, as competition for priority increases (and 
as the rewards increase), the pressure for anti-social behavior also increases.  As Merton 
puts it:  
“The culture of science is, in this measure, pathogenic. It 
can lead scientists to develop an extreme concern with 
recognition…. Contentiousness, self-assertive claims, 
secretiveness lest one be forestalled, …, even the 
occasional theft of ideas and, in rare cases, the fabrication 
of data, --all these have appeared in the history of science 
and can be thought of as deviant behavior in response to a 
discrepancy between the enormous emphasis in the culture 
of science upon original discovery and the actual difficulty 
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many scientists experience in making an original 
discovery.” (Merton 1973: 323).  
Therefore, even within the ideal type scientific reward system, there are the 
contradictory forces of the drive for disclosure and the need for secrecy to protect one’s 
lead time advantage in priority race (Hackett 1990; Merton 1957; Mitroff 1974).  This 
secrecy can take several forms.  One of these is simply refusing to discuss on-going 
research until it is published and priority has been established.2 This can be taken further 
by limiting the disclosure of knowledge or the distribution of its material embodiments 
(such as new materials, equipment, cell lines, etc.) in order to protect the discoverers’ 
advantage in exploring the follow-up research that the initial discovery opened up (Walsh, 
Cho, and Cohen 2005). Merton (1957) gives several examples of scientists submitting 
sealed manuscripts to learned societies or announcing results in code, in order to establish 
priority without tipping off their competitors.3  More recently, the researchers analyzing 
                                                 
2 Merton (1973[1957]) gives the example of Descartes’ competition with Hobbes, citing a 
letter by Descartes saying, “I also beg you to tell him [Hobbes] as little as possible about 
what you know of my unpublished opinions, for if I’m not greatly mistaken, he is a man 
who is seeking to acquire a reputation at my expense and through shady practices.” 
3 “In the seventeenth century, for example, and even as late as the nineteenth, discoveries 
were sometimes reported in the form of anagrams—as with Galileo’s “triple star” of 
Saturn and Hooke’s law of tension—for the double purpose of establishing priority of 
conception and of yet not putting rivals on to one’s original ideas, until they had been 
further worked out…. As late as the nineteenth century, the physicists Balfour Stewart 
and P.G. Tait reintroduced this practice and ‘to secure priority…  [took] the unusual step 
of publishing [their idea] as an anagram in Nature some months before the publication of 
the book.’” Sir J.J. Thompson, Recollections and Reflections [London: G. Bell, 1936] p 
22, quoted in Merton (1957:315). A contemporary example comes from research on 
superconductivity, where Paul Chu was accused of deliberately introducing a “typo” into 
his two papers submitted to Physical Review Letters (substituting Yb (ytterbium) for Y 
(yttrium) in a key formula) in order to throw off reviewers, who were also potential 
competitors.  He also applied for a patent after submitting the papers. Although reviewers 
are supposed to keep manuscripts confidential, news of the discovery leaked (including 
the mistaken formula).  Chu then corrected the error before submitting the final proofs to 
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the Cave 4 Dead Sea Scrolls kept other researchers from accessing the original scrolls, 
and tried to prevent publication of their contents, in order to both protect their ability to 
continue publishing findings from these key materials and to prevent competitors who 
critiqued their theories from readily analyzing their data. Therefore, as scientific 
competition becomes more intense, we may observe greater emphasis on secrecy, even 
within the domain of public science. Finally, tacit knowledge is also important in the 
production of scientific results (Polanyi 1967), and scientists may be reluctant to widely 
disseminate this tacit knowledge in order to maintain a temporary monopoly over these 
techniques.  These adverse effects result both from deliberate attempts to monopolize a 
research area, and from the passive result of lacking incentive to engage in the costly 
process of disseminating materials or training others in the newly discovered techniques 
(Campbell et al. 2002; Cohen and Walsh 2008).  While the gift exchange system does 
provide important incentives for engaging in these sharing behaviors, these incentives 
may be outweighed by the benefits of spending that time producing one’s own new 
discoveries.   
No matter how different the two academic and market models of science are, 
universities have been increasingly involved in economic development in recent years. 
The Triple Helix perspective (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz 1996) advocating close 
collaboration among universities, government, and industry has been well received 
(Shinn 2002).  Similarly, Stokes (1997) argues that by doing research in “Pasteur’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
the journal, causing some who followed the (incorrect) leaked formula to accuse Chu of 
deliberately trying to throw them off the trail. Others in the field say that, even if it was 
the honest mistake Chu said it was, they would understand someone doing this 
deliberately in such a high-stakes race as superconductivity was in the late 1980s, with 
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Quadrant”, scientists can both generate new knowledge and address applied needs. 
Gibbons, et al. (1994), using the term Mode 2, argue for knowledge production that is 
cross-sectoral (spanning university and industry), interdisciplinary and application-
oriented. Slaughter and her colleagues (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Slaughter and 
Rhoades 1996) argue that the new competitiveness coalition has shifted science policy to 
encourage universities to emphasize applied, commercializable research. These new 
perspectives on science policy emphasize university-industry cooperation, technology 
transfer and a more applied focus for academic research. Hackett’s (1990) competing 
values model of science suggests that the social and economic context where the 
scientific institution is embedded has a big impact on its culture. Thus, when universities 
are increasingly dependent on industry funding, they will operate more like commercial 
entities and those industry-compatible values will accordingly gain dominance. Thus, 
Hackett’s perspective implies that the two contrasting models of science (“academic/open 
science” and “industry/private science”) are two competing sides of the institution of 
science, with the relative dominance of each side depending on the contingent social and 
economic context. Similarly, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) use the term “academic 
capitalism” to describe the shifting context and the associated changes in norms and 
practices, with university researchers increasingly taking on the characteristics of 
capitalist R&D labs, both in the competitive pressures they face and their responses to 
those pressures. Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) argue that as academic capitalism 
becomes institutionalized, the distinctions between the academic/open science model and 
the industry/private science model of knowledge production blur and merge into a new 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nobel prizes and possibly substantial commercial applications at stake (Kolata, 1987, see 
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form that emphasizes knowledge production as a means of securing resources in a 
competitive environment, even among academic scientists.  
Thus, this new “hybrid” paradigm suggests that university scientists should be 
especially sensitive to outside funding and that the increasingly common acceptance of 
industry funding should be associated with greater secrecy (i.e., a weakening of the norm 
of communism). Similarly, this perspective suggests that the increasingly common 
collaborations with industry researchers should be associated with a shift toward the 
secrecy end of the openness/secrecy spectrum (Hackett, 1990).  For example, Welsh, et. 
al (2007) find that commercial activity is associated with greater adoption of market 
norms and weaker adherence to “expert science” (open science) norms. Similarly, 
commercial activity, such as patenting, should be a marker of a shift toward the market 
model and be associated with greater secrecy. In contrast, the priority-recognition-based 
model of academic science suggests that scientists should be especially sensitive to 
scientific competition and might be more secretive in the face of greater scientific 
competition. However, this model implies that industry funding, patenting, and industry 
collaboration are all likely to have weak effects, or, possibly even be associated with less 
secrecy, as they can serve to provide resources to allow winning priority races. 
 
Increasing Commercialization of Science and Increasing Secretive Behavior 
 
Despite attempts to reframe this new model of science using such positive terms as 
Mode 2, Triple Helix or Pasteur’s Quadrant, there is substantial concern that the growing 
links between the academy and the market is undermining the centrality of the scientific 
                                                                                                                                                 
also Fox, 1994). 
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reward system and leading academic scientists to engage in behaviors that undermine the 
social benefits of academic research.  In particular, there are claims that academic science 
is becoming more secretive as professors shift from focusing on publishing in order to 
gain peer recognition and toward patenting and licensing in order to garner market-based 
rewards for selling privatized knowledge.   
As academic science has becoming increasingly linked to commercial activity, there 
has been heightened concern that, particularly in biomedical fields, scientific competition 
and concern about commercial gain have led to a dysfunctional increase in secretive 
behavior among academic scientists (Bekelman, Li, and Gross 2003; Blumenthal et al. 
1997; Campbell et al. 2002; Ceci 1988; Cook-Deegan and McCormack 2001; Marshall 
1997; McCain 1991; Needham, Barlow, Elliott, Lawrenson, Newiss, Pethica, Reid, 
Sulston, and Vaver 2003). Patenting can encourage a climate of secrecy that limits the 
free flows of ideas and information that are vital for successful science.  For example, in 
a study done in the 1980s, McCain (1991) noted that in her population of geneticists, 
sharing of research tools and information generally proceeded smoothly, but warned that 
the increasing emphasis on formal property rights in information and materials was 
beginning to adversely affect the former gift exchange system. Over the next decade, 
secretive behavior in biomedical research seems to have increased. Blumenthal et al. 
(1997) find that 9% of life science faculty had refused to share research results with other 
university scientists.  Concern over scientific priority was the most common reason, with 
expense or scarcity of the material close behind.  Commercial considerations were also 
mentioned, though not as prominently. Refusing to share results was related to greater 
productivity and to greater commercialization. Almost 20% of respondents delayed 
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publication for more than six months, with concerns over patent issues being the most 
common justification and concern over scientific priority close behind.  Publication delay 
was associated with having a research relationship with industry and with 
commercializing university research. Campbell et al. (2002) report that almost half of 
academic life scientists had been denied in at least one request for information, data or 
materials (with about 10% of all requests denied). About 12% reported denying such 
requests.  The likelihood of denying a request was related to commercialization and to 
receiving many requests.   Furthermore, a significant minority (35%) felt that such 
secretive behavior is increasing over the last 10 years.  Walsh et al. (2005) found that just 
a few years later, the percent of requests refused had increased to 18% and that failing to 
provide requested research materials was related to commercial activity, as well as to 
scientific competition. Thursby and Thursby (1999) report that 32% of sponsored 
research agreements include the right to delay publication (with an average of 2.6 months 
delay) and 58% include the right to delete information from research papers prior to 
submission for publication. Cohen, Florida, and Goe (1994) also find that industry 
sponsorship often includes an agreement to delay publication to allow time to patent the 
research results.  Thus, we have evidence that secrecy in science (or, at least, in 
biomedical science) is not rare, and that the rate of secrecy may be increasing (for 
example, comparing Campbell, et al. and Walsh, et al.). 
Such secretive behavior can have a variety of negative affects on scientists and on 
science.  Campbell et al (2002) report that, for their sample, 28% of respondents said 
secretive behavior prevented verification of published research, 24% said it slowed down 
follow-on work, and 21% said it caused them to abandon promising lines of research.  
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Cook-Deegan and McCormack (2001) argue that the emphasis on secrecy and patents in 
genomics delays publication of much sequence information, greatly reducing its 
information value.  Not only do these consequences affect individual scientists, but this 
secrecy could also result in duplication of work and the inability to check prior results 
and compare results to find inaccuracies and to learn from others’ work, thereby delaying 
the progress of science as a collective effort (Cook-Deegan and McCormack 2001; 
Hagstrom 1974; Marshall 1997). However, a recent case of a scientist being “scooped” 
by his own data published on the web points to the complexity of the relationship 
between secrecy and competition, and between recognizing individual contributions and 
advancing science (Marshall 2002).  Thus, scientific competition can drive secretive 
behavior, even at the potential cost of slowing the advance of science.4 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Thus, prior work suggests that secrecy is a critical concern in the operation of the 
science system and that scientific competition and commercial concerns may both be 
driving increased secrecy in academic science.  Our research questions are: 1) has secrecy 
increased in the past three decades (i.e., during the period of transition to the 
entrepreneurial university, Hackett, 1990, Slaughter and Leslie, 1997)? 2) does the 
increase in secrecy differ across fields (i.e., is this particular to biomedical research)? 3) 
what are the factors associated with the increased secrecy? In particular, how do 
                                                 
4 In a study of a different kind of investigative work (the Detective Division of the 
Chicago Police Department), Walsh (1991) found a similar result, reporting that police 
detectives felt that a new crime-mapping system was a failure because it allowed a patrol 
officer to quickly solve a set of taxi robberies, before the detectives could make the arrest, 
costing the detectives credit. 
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commercial ties and scientific competition each affect secrecy among academics? The 
competition for priority simultaneously drives scientists to disclose findings and to hoard 
them (and especially to hoard pieces of the results that help generate follow-up findings), 
and therefore, we might see increasing secrecy even without a shift in scientists’ 
orientation away from the academic perspective and toward a commercial orientation to 
their research. On the other hand, if industry funding, patenting and industry 
collaboration are measures of a shift toward a market or hybrid model of science, they 
should be associated with more secrecy (Cohen, et al., 2000).  If, however, there has not 
been a shift in the underlying model of academic science prevalent among university 
faculty, we would not expect these ancillary activities to substantially affect the core 
academic activity of sharing research results.  We might even find positive effects, such 
that patenting, industry collaboration and industry funding are associated with less 
secrecy, as they provide resources that allow for winning priority races. Thus, both 
scientific competition and market forces have potentially offsetting effects on sharing 
among scientists.  On balance, we do not know which will dominate, nor whether any 
observed increase in secrecy is due to the one or the other mechanism, although we will 
test the relations between scientific competition and secrecy over time, by field, to see if 
any rise in secrecy can in part be explained by increased scientific competition. 
Furthermore, we will use multivariate regression techniques to try to determine the 
relative  effects of scientific competition and commercial activity, controlling for the 
other, which will help us contrast the underlying models of science that are likely to be 
driving these results.  
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Data and Method 
To empirically test the hypotheses that secrecy has increased and that this secrecy is 
driven by commercialization and/or scientific competition, and to broaden our 
understanding of secrecy and information sharing among scientists, we decided to take 
advantage of a unique set of comparable surveys that were conducted about 30 years 
apart.  The data come from two surveys of university scientists.  The first was conducted 
in 1966 by Hagstrom, who surveyed a national random sample of 1947 academic 
scientists in six fields (mathematics, experimental physics, theoretical physics, 
experimental biology, other biology, and chemistry) (Hagstrom 1974).   The second 
survey, administered in 1998 by Walsh et al. (2000), includes a national random sample 
of 399 scientists from 4 fields (experimental biology, mathematics, physics and 
sociology).  For this study, we use the three fields of mathematics, physics and 
experimental biology for comparison. The two surveys measure secrecy by asking how 
safe scientists feel in discussing their current research with others doing similar work.  
The surveys also include a measure of scientific competition, asking respondents how 
concerned they are about being anticipated in their current research.  The later survey 
also includes measures of patenting, industry funding, industry collaboration, gender, 
institution type, seniority, and publication productivity. 5  
                                                 
5 For the Hagstrom data, we combine experimental and theoretical physics. As a 
robustness check, we also used the Sullivan data on clinical biomedicine as an alternative 
measure of bio-medical research for the 1960s period (Sullivan 1975). Using the Sullivan 
data produces results that are substantially the same as those reported here.  For the 
Walsh data, we excluded industry respondents. A technical appendix (Appendix A) gives 
the details of question wording, measures and samples for the three surveys. Table A1 
provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses.  
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Using these surveys provides several important advantages.  The primary advantage 
of these data compared to other recently published studies is that they allow over-time 
comparison.  Also, while much of the recent focus has been on experimental biology 
(Blumenthal et al. 1997; Campbell et al. 2002) our data from different fields allows us to 
test if secrecy in experimental biology has become more prevalent relative to, for 
example, physics and mathematics.  Given that our dependent variables are ordered 
categorical variables, and that our data are grouped by a small number of discrete 
independent variables, we use cumulative logit models to test for changes in secrecy 
and/or competition over time and across field, as well as time-field interactions (Aldrich 
and Nelson 1984; Winship and Mare 1984).6  In addition, we can use the 1998 data to test 
a multivariate model of secrecy that extends the earlier models (Blumenthal et al. 1997; 
Campbell et al. 2002) by testing the relative impact of scientific competition versus 
market factors as explanations of secrecy. 
  
Results 
Increasing Competition, Increasing Secrecy 
Table 1 gives the comparisons over time and across fields for scientific competition 
and secrecy, presenting the responses as percent “Yes” to the questions, meaning the 
percent who are at least slightly concerned about being anticipated or who are at least 
somewhat secretive (i.e., who responded something other than “I feel safe with all others” 
to the question about discussing current research).  Using Hagstrom’s data, we can see 
that the percentage of experimental biologists in the 1960s who are at least slightly 
                                                 
6 We also used log-linear models to analyze the tables, which produced similar results 
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concerned about being anticipated (63%) is not very different from the overall average 
(64%) and ranks between physics and mathematics. Comparing over time, we see in 
Table 1 that over the last 30 years concern over scientific competition has increased in 
experimental biology (going from 63% to 81% at least slightly concerned). The overall 
average (across all fields) also increased from 64% to 74%.  
 
--INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE-- 
 
Using cumulative logit models on the ordinal (four-point) measure of competition, 
we test whether there has been a change over time, whether biology is different from the 
other two fields, and whether there is an interaction between year and field. Table 2 
shows the results for competition. In model 1, we see that there has been a significant 
change overall in competition over time.  However, we find no difference between 
biology and the other fields.  When we add the year by biology interaction effect (model 
2), however, we find that the increase over time is largely due to the increase in biology, 
with the main effects for biology and year now insignificant, and the interaction term 
significant.  This model fits significantly better than the model without the interaction 
effect (change in chi-square=14.5, 1 d.f., p<.001).  In addition, for this model, using the 
Score test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the slopes are equal across categories 
of competition (chi-square=8.9, 6 d.f., p=.18), suggesting that the effect is consistent 
across the range of the dependent variable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Fienberg 1980).   
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--INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE-- 
 
As for secrecy, Table 1 shows that, in 1966, the percent saying they are not willing 
to discuss their research with all others is higher in experimental biology (55%) 
compared to physics (48%) or mathematics (45%). We also see that, in the marginals, 
across all fields, secrecy has increased substantially in the last 30 years (rising from 49% 
being unwilling to talk with all others in 1966 to 72% in 1998). While secrecy increased 
in each of the three fields, we see a substantial increase in secrecy in experimental 
biology.  Eighty-seven percent of the 1998 sample reports being at least somewhat 
unwilling to talk about their on-going research. Table 3 shows the cumulative logit 
models testing for changes over time, fields and time by field interaction. In model 1, we 
see that there has been a significant change overall in secrecy over time.  As expected, we 
also find that biology is significantly more secretive than the other fields.  When we add 
the year by biology interaction effect (model 2), we find that, in addition to the year and 
field effect, there is a significant year by field interaction.  In other words, not only is 
biology more secretive than other fields, and not only has secrecy increased over time, 
but secrecy has particularly increased in biology.  We replicated these analyses using 
Sullivan’s (1975) data on biomedical researchers and find very similar results.  These 
findings are consistent with the findings of Campbell, et al. (2002), which show that 
biomedical researchers felt that secrecy had increased over time.  However, our results 
further show not just an absolute increase, but an increase relative to mathematics and 
physics (where secrecy has also increased). This model fits significantly better than the 
model without the interaction effect (change in chi-square=6.4, 1 d.f., p<.05).  In addition, 
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for this model, using the Score test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the slopes 
are equal across categories of secrecy (chi-square=6.1, 3 d.f., p=.11). 
 
--INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE-- 
Thus, we see evidence that secrecy has increased among academic scientists across 
fields, but especially in experimental biology.  Furthermore, we find that this change in 
secrecy is associated with the growth in scientific competition during this period.  These 
results are consistent with a Mertonian priority-reward model of academic/open science, 
since even an open science model includes the possibility of secrecy as a means of 
ensuring priority of discovery.  At the same time, since academic capitalism includes the 
concept of increasing competition for the resources to do research, these results are 
consistent with Slaughter and colleagues’ thesis that contemporary universities are 
becoming less open as a result of the rise of the competitiveness agenda and the shift to 
academic capitalism.  
 
Competition, Commercialization and Secrecy 
Based on the work of Hackett (1990) and Slaughter and her colleagues (Slaughter 
and Leslie 1997; Slaughter and Rhoades 1996; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004) we 
hypothesize that the growing links between universities and industry (the hybrid model) 
are associated with a shift in norms away from openness and toward secrecy and that this 
secrecy is associated with commercial activity and industry ties.  At the same time, 
Merton’s priority-driven reward perspective (academic model) also predicts substantial 
secrecy in the face of scientific competition for priority and recognition, but with little 
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impact from commercial activity or industry linkages expected.  In this section, we 
simultaneously test the effects of scientific competition and commercial activity (i.e., 
patenting, industry funding, and university-industry collaboration) on secrecy (being 
unwilling to talk about on-going research). We used the 1998 survey data and ran ordered 
logistic regressions. Using a specification similar to Campbell et al. (2002), we control 
for years since Ph.D., number of publications, gender, field, collaboration, and institution 
type (Carnegie Research I or not).  We then test whether patenting, industry funding, 
university-industry collaboration, or scientific competition have significant effects on 
secrecy. Table A1 gives the descriptive statistics for these data, by field.  Not surprisingly, 
experimental biologists are significantly more likely to apply for patents (p<.001), with 
30% of respondents having applied for at least one patent in the last five years.  However, 
in terms of industry funding or industry collaboration, experimental biology is not 
significantly different from the overall averages (which is also not surprising, as 
academic capitalism is not limited to biotech, but also includes many science and 
engineering fields, Slaughter and Rhoades, 1996).    
Table 4 shows the multivariate models. Model 1 is the full model using available 
data. The only control variable with a significant effect is gender.  We find that men are 
less secretive than women.  This gender difference may be due to the relatively more 
vulnerable position of women scientists leading them to be more careful about disclosing 
their findings less they lose credit for their discoveries. Other than gender, none of the 
control variables are significantly associated with secrecy.  In particular, scientific 
productivity, as measured by number of papers published, is not associated with greater, 
or with lesser, secrecy (Blumenthal et al. 1997; Campbell et al. 2002; Hagstrom 1974).  
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--INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE-- 
 
 
The major predictor of secrecy (in terms of variance explained) is scientific 
competition (chi-square=14.4, 1d.f., p<.0001, odds ratio=2.2).  In contrast, the effects of 
commercial activity are quite mixed.  Having applied for a patent has no effect, which is 
different from prior studies (Blumenthal et al. 1997; Campbell et al. 2002). However, like 
the earlier studies, we find a positive relation between industry funding and secrecy (chi-
square=4.5, 1 d.f, p<.05, odds ratio=6.4).  In contrast, having industry collaborators is 
associated with less secrecy, with an effect size close to the inverse of the funding effect 
(chi-square=3.5, 1 d.f., p<.10, odds ratio=0.2).  The prior studies did not explicitly test for 
the effects of collaborating with industry scientists.7  
                                                 
7 As a robustness check, we tested models that used a dummy variable coding for levels 
of competition, and also models with “already anticipated” recoded as missing, or as “5” 
(i.e. above “high competition”).  The results are qualitatively similar.  Prior work tends to 
code commercial activity as binary, since it is seen as a shift from an academic/open 
science model to an industry/private science model (see, for example, Berkowitz, et al. 
2001 and Campbell, et al., 2002.). However, to check whether a continuous measure of 
patenting would provide different results, we tested models that replaced patent 
application (yes/no) with number of granted patents.  The results are very similar. Finally, 
for industry funding, we do not have data on the amount of industry funding.  Again, 
prior studies tend to use a binary variable (Blumenthal, et al., 1997, Campbell, et al., 
2002).  Furthermore, Walsh, Jiang and Cohen (2007) find that, while industry funding 
(yes/no) is associated with more publication delay, there is no effect from the amount of 
funding. Still, if data were available, we would like to have explored the effects of 
different levels of funding on secrecy.  Finally, we test a specification where we control 
for collaboration by dummy variables of industry collaborator and non-industry 
collaborator, with no collaborator as the excluded category. Again, the results are 
substantively similar. [Results of alternative specifications available from contact author.] 
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We also ran a model (model 2) imputing missing values for the independent 
variables.  The results are qualitatively similar. The big substantive change is for 
industry-funding, which is still positive but not significant.  This is one of the variables 
with the most missing data.  Gender is no longer significant. Other control variables also 
fluctuate in magnitude and sign.  But, none of these differences change the fundamental 
interpretation of the impacts of academic competition and commercial activity on secrecy.  
Much of the prior work on secrecy and commercial activity in science has focused 
on experimental biology and biomedical researchers (Blumenthal, et al., 1997; Campbell, 
et al., 2002; Bekelman, et al., 2003; Cook-Deegan and Mc Cormack, 2001). In order to 
test whether the effects vary by disciplines, we ran separate models for experimental 
biologists (model 3) and mathematicians/physicists (model 4). We can see that the effect 
of scientific competition is much stronger for biologists than for mathematicians/ 
physicists (field difference in the coefficients is significant, p<.05). 8 The effect of 
“Concern over competition” for biologists is about three time that for 
mathematicians/physicists. Publications also increase biologists’ secrecy, which again 
suggests that competition may be driving secrecy, since the most publication-active 
scientists are also the most secretive (field differences in the coefficients are not quite 
significant at conventional levels, p<.15).  But, the effects of other market factors are far 
stronger for mathematicians/physicists. Applying for a patent becomes marginally 
significant in predicting the secrecy behavior of mathematicians/physicists (field 
differences not quite significant, p<.11). Industry-funded mathematicians or physicists 
                                                 
8 We use a model interacting field (biology) with all the predictor variables to test 
for the significance of the differences in coefficients across fields [results available from 
contact author].   
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are more likely to be secretive (than are industry-funded biologists), while those 
mathematicians and physicists with industry collaborators are more open regarding their 
findings (than are biologists with industry collaborators). These effects are consistent 
with model 1, but stronger in their magnitude. However, because of the large standard 
errors, we cannot reject the hypotheses that these effects are the same across fields. 
Similarly, being male has a negative effect in both models, with the effect larger in 
mathematics/physics, although we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two effects are 
equal.  
Biology has been highlighted as a field where research ethics are particularly 
susceptible to commercial activity. Yet, even for experimental biologists we find that  
scientific competition is the predominant factor contributing to secretive behavior. We 
also see that industry funding (but not patenting) is associated with greater secrecy,  
although patenting is associated with increased secrecy for physics/mathematics. While 
these across-field differences are important, we can also see that scientific competition 
(concern over competition) and market factors (industry funded or industry collaborator) 
essentially have the same effects (in terms of direction) on scientists’ secretive behavior 
across fields, although they differ somewhat in magnitude. Therefore, we can conclude 
that our results are robust to missing data and across fields.  
 
Conclusions 
Our results suggest that concerns over secrecy and the increase in secretive 
behavior in science, and biomedical research in particular, may have substantial merit.  
We see a substantial increase in secrecy over the last 30 years, with the effect most 
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pronounced in experimental biology.  This period coincides with the rise of the 
competitiveness agenda and the entrepreneurial university in the U.S. Interestingly, 
recent research on industrial R&D also finds evidence that researchers are becoming 
more secretive (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000), consistent with Slaughter and Leslie’s 
(1997) arguments about the growth in global competition. Furthermore, we find that 
scientific competition is a significant predictor of secrecy. These findings are consistent 
with Campbell’s findings that the primary causes of failure to share were the effort 
involved and concerns about publication, with patenting and licensing concerns far down 
the list (Campbell et al. 2002). Similarly, Walsh, et al. (2007) find that scientific 
competition is an important predictor of withholding of research materials and 
unpublished data. Unlike prior studies by Campbell, Blumenthal and colleagues, for our 
full sample, we do not find a significant relationship between patenting and secrecy, 
although patenting has a marginal effect on secrecy for mathematicians/physicists 
(Blumenthal et al. 1997; Campbell et al. 2002). Differences in measures and in sample 
sizes may account for some of this difference.9  Like earlier studies, we do find that 
industry funding is associated with increased secrecy.  However, we also find that 
university-industry collaboration is associated with less secrecy (which prior studies did 
not test). Thus, unlike prior work that highlights the negative aspects of university-
industry linkages, our results suggest a more complicated and interesting picture.  These 
university-industry collaborations can be viewed as part of a professor’s strategy to share 
                                                 
9 For example, the Blumenthal study and the Campbell study use a much broader 
measure of “patenting-related activity”: coding a respondent as commercially active if 
their research has resulted in a patent application (the current study’s measure), issued 
patent, patent license, trade secret, product under regulatory review, product or service 
currently being marketed or a startup company. 
 29
findings and expertise with the wider scientific and technical community. For companies, 
timeliness and customization of information are often more important than exclusivity, so 
they may be willing to tolerate, even encourage, their academic collaborators' 
participation in the shared conversation of a scientific field, thereby giving the company 
access to the whole community's expertise (Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong 2002). In 
contrast to these collaborations, industry funding alone is often associated with a 
university laboratory acting as a subcontractor to a company's R&D project, and may 
produce the associated secretive behaviors. Thus, although we need to be wary of the 
strings attached to industry funding, perhaps university-industry collaborative research 
should be encouraged, or at least not discouraged, especially if it can be framed in an 
academic/open science context.  The findings of a negative relation between industry 
collaboration and secrecy suggests that exposure to the norms of industry scientists does 
not necessarily undermine the open-science norm of communism among academic 
scientists, and that these two institutional spheres can be compatible at the level of the 
individual scientist.  
Our results have several limitations that suggest caution in interpreting the findings.  
First, the multivariate results are cross sectional, and so we do not know the directions of 
the relationships we observe.  In addition, the sample size is modest and so we may not 
be able to detect some effects.  Also, we did not measure other types of secrecy, such as 
delay in publication or being unwilling to share materials.  Similarly, broader measures of 
commercial activity (including levels of funding, or participating in licensing or startups) 
might better capture the concept of “participating in market-based science” (see footnote 
9).  Similarly, we would want to know whether other measures of scientific competition 
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(number of competitors, the extent to which being second reduces recognition, difficulty 
in getting public funding for one’s research) might similarly affect secrecy.  In addition, 
we have modeled these relationships at the individual level.  However, we suspect that 
organizational-level factors are also important.  In particular, not only do individual 
scientists compete, but universities also compete for prestige and resources (Slaughter 
and Leslie 1997), and future work should test both the organizational-level responses to 
scientific competition and commercial opportunities, and test the multi-level interactions 
between individual and organizational-level competition (see Walsh, Jiang and Cohen 
2007). Thus, further work is needed to see how robust our findings are to other measures 
and samples.  In particular, we want to know how robust our scientific competition 
findings are to other tests of its role in explaining secrecy in science relative to market 
activity. Also, while much of the research in this area has the implicit concern that 
secrecy may harm scientific progress, we need to demonstrate the relationships between 
particular forms of secrecy and various scientific outcomes. Secrecy, competition and 
openness form a complicated relation in scientific communities, as scientists attempt to 
provide timely and certified (substantially) correct results in order to establish scientific 
reputations (which encourages openness), in the face of competition from rival scientists 
who are trying to accomplish the same thing (which encourages secrecy until the work 
can be completed) (Merton 1973, Cohen and Walsh 2008).  The overall impact is not 
clear.  For example, overall we see no relation (positive nor negative) between individual 
productivity and secrecy, although there is a positive relationship if we restrict our 
sample to experimental biologists. More importantly, we would like to see the impact of 
secrecy on the net productivity of scientific communities, perhaps by comparing across 
 31
fields, over time and between institutional environments (e.g., universities, government 
labs, and industry), or comparing different countries.  Of course, finding measure of the 
“progress of science” that can be applied across broad samples has proven difficult. 
Thus, while there is some evidence that academics are now operating under a new 
paradigm, we also see evidence that the changing institutional context of university 
research is reinforcing the long-standing academic model of science, and perhaps 
exacerbating some of the fault lines in that system. This increase in scientific competition 
(and the associated increase in secrecy) can be seen as an intensification of the open 
science, priority-recognition model (Merton, 1957), or as the result of the changing 
institutional context as a result of the rise of the competitiveness coalition’s view of 
science policy and the resulting pressures on universities and their faculty to be 
productive in order to generate their own resources (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997).  There 
is  evidence of the hybrid or academic capitalism model in the relation between industry 
funding and secrecy (Gibbons, et al., 1994, Slaughter and Leslie, 1997, Slaughter and 
Rhoades, 2004), which suggests that the search for resources may be leading scientists to 
back away from their communism norms in order to gain research resources from 
industry.  Or, this relation between secrecy and industry funding may be endogenous to 
an overall shift in norms toward a more industry/private science agenda (perhaps at the 
urging of university administrators or in response to signals from Federal and state 
science policies) producing both more secrecy and greater interest in gaining industry 
funding.  
Overall, these findings (and related studies) suggest that secrecy has increased 
among academic scientists, but that the focus on commercialization as the cause may 
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underestimate the effects of scientific competition. We need to unpack the various 
dimensions of commercialization, sharing and secrecy to see what aspects are affected by 
what. Although it is right to raise concerns about the negative effects of publication 
restrictions associated with industry funding, we should also focus on the adverse effects 
of scientific competition. Our research highlights the central role that scientists’ 
competition for priority plays in the system of science and that, while such competition 
spurs effort, it also produces negative effects that recent trends toward commercialization 
of academic science seem to be exacerbating. We should keep these results in mind when 
discussing policy initiatives designed to foster more openness in science, such as 
mandatory data sharing requirements. While recent increases in US government funding 
for science may help to lower the intensity of competition, as well as the dependence on 
industry funding, it is also possible that they will increase the payoffs from engaging in 
academic capitalism, as researchers and universities compete to advance in the prestige 
and funding hierarchies.  
So long as university research is judged by the competitiveness coalition’s agenda, 
it may be difficult to reduce secrecy. While it might be hard to conceive in the 
contemporary policy context, a shift to a more secure funding stream, uncoupled from 
immediate (and immediately commercializable) results, would likely reduce the negative 
effects of scientific competition and help bolster the norm of communism.  As noted 
above, it is an open question, and worth debating, whether this shift away from academic 
capitalism would result in a decrease or increase in the progress of science, with the 
private incentives of the industry/private science model balanced against the efficiency 
gains from an open science model with various researchers building off a common 
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knowledge base and in turn contributing to that base, to build up both Bohr’s and 
Pasteur’s Quadrants. However, both from the perspective of the sociology (and 
economics) of science and from a science policy perspective, it is worth considering how 
alternative institutional arrangements might achieve the widely accepted goal of 






Appendix A: Samples, Measures and Descriptive Statistics 
I. Samples: 
A. The Hagstrom data were collected in 1966, using a mail questionnaire with phone 
follow-up of non-respondents. He surveyed a random sample of mathematicians and 
statisticians, physicists, chemists and biologists in U.S. universities offering graduate 
degrees in these field. The final sample size was 1947 respondents, with an 89% response 
rate . 
B. The Sullivan data were collected in 1968, using face-to-face interviews with mail 
questionnaire follow-up of non-respondents. He surveyed bio-medical researchers (90% 
were M.D.s) from two hospitals. The final sample size 387 respondents, with a 72% 
response rate. 
C. The Walsh, et al. data were collected in 1998, using a mail questionnaire with multiple 
mail follow-ups. They surveyed a national random sample of experimental biologists, 
mathematicians, physicists and sociologists.  The sampling frame was the relevant 
professional society membership directory. The directories used were those of the 
Federation of American Societies of Experimental Biology (Biochemical and Molecular 
Biology and Cell Biology divisions), American Mathematical Society, American 
Physical Society, and American Sociological Association.  The data consist of responses 
from 399 scientists, representing 51.3% of the eligible sample.  A comparison between 
respondents and non-respondents finds no difference in terms of gender, but shows the 
sample to somewhat under-represent those from Carnegie Research I universities.  For 
this study, we limit the sample to Ph.D./M.D. respondents from experimental biology, 
mathematics and physics, and who are not working in industry. This gives us an N of 202. 
 
II. Measures: 
The surveys each provide very similar measures of secrecy and of scientific competition, 





“Would you feel quite safe in discussing your current research with other persons doing 
similar work in other institutions?” 
1. Feel safe with all others 
2. Feel safe with most others 
3. Feel safe only with a few I can trust 
 
2. Sullivan 
“Would you feel quite safe in discussing your current research with other persons doing 
similar work in other institutions or do you think it necessary to conceal the details of 
your work from some of them until you are ready to publish?” 
1. I feel safe in discussing my work with all others 
2. I feel safe in discussing my work with most others 
3. I feel safe in discussing my work with only a few I can trust 
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3. Walsh, et al. 
“How safe do you feel in discussing your current work with other persons doing similar 
work (other than your collaborators)?” 
1. I feel safe with all others 
2. I feel safe with most others 





“How concerned are you that you might be anticipated in your current research?” 
1. I have already been anticipated 
2. Very concerned 
3. Moderately concerned 
4. Slightly concerned 
5. Not at all concerned 
 
3. Walsh, et al. 
“How concerned are you that you might be anticipated in your current research?”  
1. I have already been anticipated 
2. I am very concerned 
3. I am moderately concerned 
4. I am slightly concerned 
5. I am not at all concerned 
 
In our analysis, we reverse the coding, so that 1= not at all concerned and 5=I 
have already been anticipated, thus making this a measure of increased concern 
about scientific competition. Following Hagstrom (1974) we also combined “I 
have already been anticipated” and “very concerned”, creating a four-point scale. 
When we ran the multivariate model without the recoding, or with “I have already 
been anticipated” coded as missing, the results are qualitatively the same 
(available from author). Sullivan did not report results for the competition 
question by response category. 
 
C. Other Variables 
 
To measure the impact of market orientation, the Walsh, et al. survey asks if the 
respondent has, in the last five years, applied for a patent based on his research. We code 
this as a binary variable, with 1=“yes” and 0=“no”.  In addition, this survey contains a 
question asking if the respondent has research funding and if so, what is the source.  
Based on this item, we coded a binary variable as 1 if they have industry funding and 0 
otherwise. The survey also asks respondents if they are currently involved in any 
collaborative research.  We code this as a binary variable, with 1=“yes”, 0=“no”.  For 
those who are collaborating, we ask for the institutional affiliation of up to seven 
collaborators.  From this data we coded a binary variable, with 1=(at least one 
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collaborator from a commercial firm), and zero otherwise.  If a respondent has no 
collaborators, this variable equals zero (no industry collaborator). 
The Walsh, et al. survey also has several control variables similar to those used in 
the prior studies.  These include gender (1=male, 0=female); institution type (1= 
Carnegie Research I, 0=other); years since Ph.D. (which is likely to be closely correlated 
with academic rank); and publication productivity (number of papers published in 
refereed journals in the prior two years).  Descriptive statistics and tests of field 
differences are reported in Table A1 below. 
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Table 1: Competition and Secrecy in Three Fields across Time. 
 
                 1966  1998 




(N=)  %Yes (N=)  %Yes (N=)  %Yes   (N=) 
Experimental 
Biology 63% (316) 55% (316) 81% (80) 87% (89) 
Mathematics 60% (275) 45% (282) 68% (38) 55% (42) 
Physics 68% (438) 48% (444) 67% (58) 64% (61) 
Total 64% (1029) 49% (1042) 74% (176) 72% (192) 
 
Note: For Competition, “Yes” means at least “slightly concerned” about being anticipated.  
For Secrecy, “Yes” means that they do not feel safe talking with all others about their 




Table 2. Cumulative Logit Models of Competition on Year and Field. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Independent 
Variable  Coefficient (S.E.) 
  Coefficient (S.E.)  
Year  0.7317***   0.1444 25.7  0.2591 0.1920 1.8 
Biology  0.1130 0.1110 1.0  -0.0799 0.1229 0.4 
Year*Biolog
y      1.1284
*** 0.2915 15.0 
Intercept1  -2.6886***  0.1181 518.3  -2.6566***   0.1196 493.6 
Intercept2  -0.8477*** 0.0742 130.4  -0.7925***  0.0754 110.3 
Intercept3  0.5516*** 0.0717 59.1  0.6153*** 0.0740 69.2 
Likelihood 
Ratio Test         27.2*** 41.7
***   
d.f.     2 3   
Number of 
respondents     1235 1235   
Note: 
 




Table 3. Cumulative Logit Models of Secrecy on Year and Field. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Independent 
Variable  Coefficient (S.E.) 
  Coefficient (S.E.)  
Year  0.7996***   0.1554 26.5  0.4640* 0.2040 5.2 
Biology  0.4539*** 0.1190 14.5  0.3131* 0.1310 5.7 
Year*Biolog
y      0.7762
* 0.3129 6.2 
Intercept1  -2.8330***  0.1228 532.4  -2.8103***   0.1246 508.8 
Intercept2  -0.1490*** 0.0716 4.3  -0.1025***   0.0735 1.9 
Likelihood 
Ratio Test         47.7
*** 54.1***   
d.f.     2 3   
Number of 
respondents     1234 1234   
Note: 
 
*p< .05  **p< .01  ***p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
 
 43
Table 4. Ordered Logistic Regression of Secrecy on Scientific Competition, 
Patenting, and Industry Funding. 
 
 Model 1    (All)       
Model 2 
(Impute Missing)
     Model 3 
(Exp. Bio) 



































































































(0.3706)     
Intercept1  -4.3944
***

















Ratio Test     46.8033
*** N/Aa 27.6216***  14.3496 
d.f. 10 10 9  9 
Number of 
respondents 143 202 64  79 
Note: 
a. The multiple imputation method that we use creates five imputed datasets and 
generates estimates of model 1 respectively. The final imputed results (coefficients 
shown in model 2) are averages from those individual imputations. Although a 
Likelihood Ratio Test is available for each individual imputation, it is not available for 
the multi-model average. 




Table A1. Descriptive Statistics on Secrecy, Competition, Commercialization and 
Control Variables, Means (standard errors).  
 


































































































N= 202 91 44 67  
 
Notes: Mean for Secrecy is on a three point scale and for Competition is on a four point 
scale (with “already anticipated” recoded as “very concerned”), see Appendix.  
Significance tests are for field differences, using one-way ANOVA.  
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